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020 _a9781509912759
_qHB
020 _a9781509912735
_qePDF
020 _a9781509912742
_qePub
040 _aES-MaCNC
_cES-MaCNC
100 1 _aBurke, Jarleth M.
_97290
245 1 2 _aA critical account of Article 106(2) TFEU
_b: goverment failure in public service provision.
_cJarleth M. Burke
260 _aOxford [UK]
_aPortland, Oregon
_bHart Publishing
_c2018
300 _a218 p.
_c24 cm.
336 _2isbdcontent
_aTexto (visual)
337 _2isbdmedia
_asin mediación
490 _a Hart Studies in Competition Law
500 _aIncludes bibliograhical references and index
520 _aA Critical Account of Article 106(2) TFEU: Government Failure in Public Service Provision offers a sceptical perspective on how EU law applies to public services. Article 106(2) provides that other Treaty rules may be disapplied in order to sustain a Service of General Economic Interest (SGEI). The rhetorical presentation of Article 106(2) is as a strict exception. As a result, Article 106(2) is often presented as a threat to Europe's public service tradition. This book challenges those shibboleths by using the concept of government failure. It is concerned with instances of government intervention that are unnecessary, generate avoidable inefficiencies, or that can be bettered so as to realise general interest goals more efficaciously. As an element of the government failure critique, a market feasibility test incorporating the concept of market failure is used to expose laxity in the review of general interests under Article 106(2). Complementing that, the process of disapplying other Treaty rules under Article 106(2) is shown to have evolved from being strict to being highly indulgent of SGEI providers, with a relatively recent but only partial correction post Altmark. Overall, the strict exception label for Article 106(2) does not hold. Moreover, it is contingent and presents no legitimate general interest related threat to the organisation and delivery of public services. A comprehensive re-orientation of Article 106(2) on issues of proof is required, as is greater reliance on market counterfactuals, and much more careful separation of objectives and means in SGEI operation and design. Through these measures, the toleration of government failure can be stemmed and Article 106(2)'s contingency reduced.
650 4 _aDerecho
_9332
650 4 _aRegulación
_91079
653 0 _aServicio público
856 4 1 _zVer índice
_uhttp://bibliotecacnmc.bage.es/cgi-bin/koha/opac-retrieve-file.pl?id=5508590d7b8469ec52dd7447d3606913
942 _2udc
_cMON